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Abstract 
This paper examines fear and anger content in the political rhetoric of former US President 
George W. Bush and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair during the period 2001-2003. A 
total of 49 terrorism-related speeches were coded for content that could plausibly elicit fear or 
anger in listeners. Although anger and fear inductions were present in the vast majority of 
coded speeches, the percentage of speeches containing emotional content varied widely over 
time and between speakers with the highest levels present in the lead up to the War in Iraq. The 
content of Bush’s communication was also considered alongside polling data measuring 
presidential approval and fear of falling victim to a terrorist attack. Results indicate that fear 
content in political rhetoric was not associated with significant changes in public fear of 
terrorism. However, the presence of emotional content did coincide with declining presidential 
approval. This finding is consistent with claims that emotional appeals are selectively deployed 
at times of declining public support for governments and their counter-terrorism policies (De 
Castella, McGarty & Musgrove, 2009). However, the lack of relationship between fear content 
and fear levels also raises questions about the purpose and effectiveness of alleged fear appeals. 
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Two Leaders, Two Wars: A Psychological Analysis of Emotional Content in Political Rhetoric. 
Over the last decade there has been increasing interest in the role of emotion in political 
communication, campaigns and decision-making. And, in the declared ‘new age’ of terrorism 
many political leaders have been charged with manipulating public emotions – particularly fear 
and anger – to distract audiences from other issues (Muller, 2004; Prewitt et al., 2004); mute 
criticism and dissent (Furedi, 1997; Krebs & Lobasz, 2007); and, to legitimise and promote 
support for counter-terrorism policies at the expense of civil liberties and human rights 
(Flyghed, 2005; Marmor-Lavie & Weimann, 2005; Sunstein, 2004). If it is true that political 
leaders have attempted to use emotional manipulation to garner political support for the War on 
Terror, then it is important to examine the degree to which this is politically and socially 
acceptable in democratic societies. On the other hand, if the allegation is not true, then it is 
important to revise such claims of widespread emotional manipulation (Lupia & Menning, 
2009). 
While much of the work in this area has focused on discourse analyses, political 
commentary and debate (Jackson, 2005a, 2005b; Maser, 2004; Padgett & Allen, 2003; Spence, 
2005; Stern, 2000) a number of studies have found that emotional priming can have diverse 
consequences. Among these include an impact on political judgments (Brader, 2005; 2006; 
Marcus & Mackuen, 1993; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse & Stevens, 2005); causal 
attributions for terrorism (Small, Lerner & Fischoff, 2006); risk estimates, support for counter 
terrorism policies and plans for precautionary measures (Huddy, Feldman, Taber & Lahav, 
2010; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Other terrorism-
related research has linked the experience of anger and fear with increased authoritarianism 
(Hastings & Shaffer, 2005), ethnocentrism (Skitka, Bauman & Mullen, 2004); close-
mindedness (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos & Provost, 2002); reliance on social stereotypes 
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(Bodenhausen, Shepard & Kramer, 1994); and support for pre-emptive action towards an out-
group (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003; Lake & Rothchild, 1998). And, from the perspective of 
terror management theory, fear in particular has been found to promote increased nationalism 
and patriotism, intolerance for dissent, hostility towards those who are different, and a desire 
for vengeance (Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 1997; Solomon, Greenberg & 
Pyszczynski, 2004). Experimental research also indicates that through skilful communication it 
is possible to produce targeted emotional responses in listeners (Dillard & Nabi, 2006; Gross & 
Ambrosio, 2004; Small, Lerner & Fischhoff, 2006). 
It seems plausible for these reasons that political communicators might choose to play 
on audience fears, but is it possible to prove that emotional manipulation has occurred? Krebs 
and Jackson (2007) are sceptical, that researchers in the field can overcome the methodological 
hurdles necessary to demonstrate that this has occurred. Political persuasion, they argue would 
require knowledge of a speakers’ ‘real motives’ and the ability to distinguish between sincere 
beliefs and those adopted for strategic purposes. Motives have long been regarded as “the most 
illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the 
interests and emotions of actor and observer alike” (Morgenthau, 1978, p.5). While to the 
analyst, true motives are unknown and unknowable; the explicit content of political 
communication is very much accessible. 
We sympathise with the position of Krebs and Jackson (2007). We do not have access 
to details of motivation so we cannot prove that political leaders are engaged in emotional 
manipulation, but if emotional manipulation is taking place we would expect it to leave 
discernable traces in political communications. In other words, it is possible to ask whether 
there is evidence consistent with the emotional manipulation thesis. If, on the one hand, there is 
no such evidence then the claim of emotional manipulation would appear to be false. On the 
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other hand, if there is evidence then although this does not prove that the manipulation was 
deliberate, or that it was effective, it would provide a strong platform for further investigations 
of these questions. 
Recently, De Castella, McGarty and Musgrove (2009) conducted an analysis of the 
political rhetoric of former Australian Prime Minister John Howard. These authors applied 
appraisal theory to a content analysis of Howard’s speeches on the War on Terror, with a 
specific focus on fear content. In coding Howard’s speeches between 2001 and 2006, they 
found that fear inducing content was not a constant feature of Howard’s rhetoric but it was in 
fact highly variable and most prevalent at the point where the Australian Government was 
seeking to bolster support for Australia’s looming involvement in the invasion of Iraq.  
The current paper uses the appraisal theory-based form of content analysis developed by 
De Castella et al. (2009) to assess the extent to which fear- and anger-content is present in 
political rhetoric of other speakers. While appraisal theory has been used previously in research 
on fear, anger, causal attributions and risk assessment (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner, 
Gonzalez, Small & Fischoff, 2003; Small, Lerner & Fischhoff, 2006), it has only recently been 
used as a basis for content analysis. This study thus aims to extend the methods of De Castella 
et al. (2009) to the fear and anger content in the political rhetoric of two former Western leaders 
in the War on Terror: US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. In 
considering their public speeches, we sought to answer three key questions:  
(Q1) Is there evidence of fear or anger appraisal content in the terrorism-related rhetoric 
of George W. Bush and Tony Blair? If present,  
(Q2) Which of the two emotions are most common in speeches about terrorism and do 
the speakers differ in this regard?  
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(Q3) Is the quantity or form of emotional content similar between speakers and how 
does it vary over time with respect to the broader political climate in which the speeches 
are delivered? 
Due to the lack of published data in the United Kingdom we ask two further questions about 
speeches made by former President Bush. 
(Q4) Is the presence of fear content associated with fear of terrorism in a population? 
And,  
(Q5) Is the presence of emotional content in rhetoric about terrorism related to the level 
of public support for that leader or their policies? 
Appraisal Theory  
Appraisal theory (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b, 2001; Scherer, 1993; Smith & 
Lazarus, 1990, 1993) presents a cognition-emotion model that describes the conditions 
necessary for eliciting of a wide range of emotions. In the context of terrorism it has been used 
in psychological research on emotion, political judgments and decision-making (See: Lerner & 
Keltner, 2000; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischoff, 2003; Small, Lerner & Fischhoff, 2006). 
  According to appraisal theory, emotions are elicited not by situations, events or objects 
themselves but by perceivers’ cognitive appraisals of those things (Lazarus, 1991b). Specific 
combinations of these discrete emotion-eliciting cognitions then produce distinct emotional 
responses in people. Two key appraisals are necessary for arousing anger and fear: appraisals of 
(a) motivational/goal relevance – the belief that matters being discussed are personally relevant; 
and, (b) motivational/goal incongruence – the belief that the issues at hand are potentially 
unpleasant or harmful (Lazarus, 1991a, b; Smith & Lazarus, 1993).  
The elicitation of fear also requires (c) concerns about one’s ability to cope with the 
present threat (uncertain coping). While anger, on the other hand, requires (d) an attribution of 
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blame — a belief that someone or something is accountable for the harmful or threatening 
situation. These last two components are termed ‘secondary appraisals’ and play a pivotal role 
in the appraisal process and ultimately determine whether a harmful situation evokes anger, 
fear or even guilt (as would be the case if someone believed themselves to be responsible for 
the morally violating or threatening situation). If audience members believe a situation is 
personally relevant, harmful or threatening, and is a direct consequence of someone else’s 
actions, they will most likely experience anger at the responsible party. If, however, they 
concentrate on their own inability to cope with the present threat then fear is expected as the 
primary emotional response. These secondary appraisal elements are closely related to Lazarus’ 
notion of ‘core-relational themes’: a “synthesis of the separate appraisal components into a 
complex, meaning-centred whole [which] determines the nature of the emotional response” 
(1991c, p. 64). According to Lazarus’ model, the experience of fear is bound up with a core 
relational theme of existential threat or danger while anger is tied to the theme of other blame. 
Based on Lazarus’s (1991a, b) criteria for anger and fear appraisal, the current project 
uses a content analytic approach to examine key terrorism speeches presented by George Bush 
and Tony Blair between September 11, 2001 and May 1, 2003 — the declared end of major 
combat operations in Iraq. This time-period was selected to capture all terrorism-related 
speeches delivered in the aftermath of the September 11, as well as speeches delivered in the 
lead up to, and during two periods of major combat operations: The War on Afghanistan and 
The War on Iraq.   
Method 
Texts 
For both speakers we sought to obtain a comprehensive sample of all key television and 
radio addresses to the nation on the topic of terrorism within the date parameters (September 
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11, 2001 - May 1, 2003). Press conferences, written statements, press releases, media remarks 
and conference speeches were excluded, as were speeches that were less than 400 words in 
length. For each speech the percentage of content on the topic of terrorism was calculated by 
dividing the total number of sentences relating to terrorism, foreign threats and national 
security by the total number of sentences in each speech. Where less than 50% of a speech’s 
content related to these themes it was also excluded from the analysis. 
George Bush’s speeches were retrieved from the White House website 
(www.whitehouse.gov/president). Speeches were obtained from three separate archives: 1. 
Renewal in Iraq, 2. National Security, and 3. Homeland Security. From these archives, a total 
of 30 national and radio addresses to the nation were identified that met the search criteria. 
Speeches by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair were retrieved from the “statements” 
and “speeches” archives of Number10.gov.uk (The official site of the Prime Minister’s Office). 
The site’s news section provides links to all speeches presented by Tony Blair, archived by 
year. While Blair delivered very few nationally televised addresses on the topic of terrorism, 
his public statements and parliamentary speeches were of a comparable length and focus and 
were frequently televised. For this reason, these speeches were also included in the search 
criteria. From these archives, a total of nineteen speeches were found on the topic of terrorism 
within the date parameters. The complete sample of 49 speeches contained a total of 7,758 
statements, each of which were coded for the presence of anger- and fear-appraisal elements. It 
is important to emphasise therefore that each data point is based on a large number of 
observations. 
Content Coding  
Each speech was independently coded by the first author for all six appraisal 
components necessary to meet the criteria for anger or fear appraisal. These included sentences 
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containing statements that expressed: (a) core-relational themes of threat or danger; (b) core 
relational themes of other blame; (c) motivational relevance; (d) motivational incongruence; (e) 
low or uncertain ability to cope with the present threat; and, (f) attributions of blame or 
accountability to a specific ‘other’. Some sentences contained more than one appraisal element 
so the proportions obtained for the different components are not independent of each other. 
A three page sample of content was then coded independently by two additional coders 
who were unaware of the questions we were addressing to establish inter-coder reliability. Each 
coder examined 50 statements, selected from a random cross-section of the sampled speeches. 
Coders were required to indicate which (if any) appraisal components were present by ticking 
the appropriate combination of boxes. All six appraisal categories were provided with a seventh 
option: no content. A correct answer was recorded when coders ticked the same boxes as the 
researcher and when they left the same boxes unchecked. In total, the 50 statements provided a 
score out of 50 for each of the seven categories.  
 Content was first coded for core relational themes of ‘danger or threat’, which were 
defined as statements about terrorism-related risks and dangers. They included comments about 
the consequences terrorist actions could have for the listeners’ safety, security and freedoms. 
For example: “The world understands that whilst, of course, there are dangers in acting, the 
dangers of inaction are far, far greater. The threats of further such outrages, the threat to our 
economies, the threat to the stability of the world.” (Blair, October 7, 2001), and “No nation 
can be neutral in this conflict, because no civilized nation can be secure in a world threatened 
by terror” (Bush, November 6, 2001). For this category, 95% of the utterances coded as 
threatening by the researcher were also identified as threatening by the supplementary coders. 
This indicates high overall inter-rater reliability for this construct.  
 Core-relational themes of ‘other blame’ were defined as general stereotypical statements 
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about the ‘evil other’, the ‘war on terror’; and the ‘fight against evil’. They included statements 
like: “The terrorists are traitors to their own faith… we have seen their kind before. They are 
the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century.” (Bush, September 20, 2001), and 
“Osama bin Laden’s philosophy… is an assault on our hearts and minds. It represents 
extremism, cruelty, intolerance of different cultures and lifestyles…” (Blair, April 7, 2002). 
Inter-rater reliability for this construct was also high with 93% of the utterances coded 
consistently across the three coders.  
 For the purposes of coding, motivational relevance was defined as any statements, which 
promoted thinking about how the situation specifically affected the listener, was bad for them, 
or placed them in danger. It included statements about the suffering, responsibilities, and 
dangers facing one’s country, Western nations, or even the world at large: “We’re in a fight for 
the freedom and for the security of the American people. We’re in a fight for the values of a 
civilization” (Bush, January 23, 2002); and “whoever committed these acts of terrorism will 
have murdered at least a hundred British citizens, maybe many more. Murder of British people 
in New York is no different in nature from their murder in the heart of Britain itself” (Blair, 
September 14, 2001). For this category 88% of the statements coded as motivationally relevant 
by the researcher were identified as such by the two supplementary coders. 
Motivationally incongruent statements were defined as claims about the importance of 
the situation and its harmful, evil or dangerous nature. Appraisal of motivational incongruence 
included statements of remorse, hatred or disgust at terrorists or terrorist attacks, concerns for 
the future, and possible risks that the audience may face. For example: “Those who celebrate 
the murder of innocent men, women, and children have no religion, have no conscience, and 
have no mercy” (Bush, November 8 2001) and “If we do not deal with the threat from this 
international outlaw and his barbaric regime, it may not erupt and engulf us this month or next; 
10 
perhaps not even this year or the next. But it will at some point.” (Blair, September 10, 2002). 
Inter-rater reliability was once again high with 91% of statements coded by the researcher also 
identified by the two independent coders. 
The two secondary appraisal components (uncertain coping and other accountability) 
served as the primary means for identifying specific fear and anger evoking content. Content 
was coded for uncertain coping when statements suggested to listeners that they were in danger, 
at risk of terrorist attack and/or may be unable to protect themselves against such risks. As such 
it required that all other appraisal elements were present. For example: “The danger to our 
country is grave and it is growing... The attacks of September the 11th showed our country that 
vast oceans no longer protect us from danger” (Bush, September 28, 2002); “We know that if 
not stopped, the terrorists will do it again, this time possibly in Britain” (Blair, October 8, 
2001). For this category, 92% of statements coded for ‘uncertain coping’ by the researcher 
were also identified by the supplementary coders. 
Statements promoting other accountability were defined as remarks that attributed blame 
and responsibility for incongruent, harmful or threatening events. For example: “Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical 
weapons to kill thousands of people” (Bush, September 28, 2002); and, “The regime of Saddam 
is detestable. Brutal, repressive, political opponents routinely tortured and executed” (Blair, 
April 7 2002). Inter-coder reliability for this item was also high with 94% of utterances coded 
for attributions of blame also identified by the two independent coders. 
Results 
 The percentage of each speech containing fear and anger content was calculated by 
dividing the number of statements meeting the criteria for fear or anger appraisal by the total 
number of sentences in each speech. Statements consistent with fear or anger appraisal required 
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the presence of (a) a core-relational theme of threat or blame; (b) sentiments that were 
motivationally relevant and (c) motivational incongruent for the listener as well as one of two 
secondary appraisal elements. For fear, statements needed imply an inability to cope with 
potential dangers or risks (uncertain coping) while for anger statements required attributions of 
blame (other accountability). Because anger and fear appraisal typically require that all the 
primary appraisal elements are present, these secondary components were the primary means 
for distinguishing between the two kinds of emotion-eliciting content. When a statement 
contained all primary appraisal elements in conjunction with claims of (d) low or uncertain 
ability to cope with the present threat, it was coded as fear content. Anger-consistent statements 
on the other hand, contained all primary appraisal elements and (e) attributions of blame or 
accountability to a specific ‘other’. Because some statements contained both secondary 
appraisal elements the obtained proportions are not independent of each other. The proportions 
of fear and anger-consistent speech content was then graphed over the time period (Figure 1). 
Differences between Speakers 
 While both speakers displayed similar patterns over time, there were key differences 
between them: First, fear-consistent appraisals were generally more pervasive within Bush’s 
rhetoric and in some cases accounted for almost 40% of the speech content. Fear content was 
much lower in Blair’s political speeches and rarely exceeded 15-20% of coded material. 
Secondly, of the two emotions, Blair’s speeches more frequently contained anger content, 
which exceeded the total amount of fear-content in each of the 19 coded speeches. Bush’s 
speeches, on the other hand, were more frequently dominated by fear-consistent appraisals, 
which were identified as the primary emotion coded in exactly half of his 30 speeches. The 
third and final difference between the two speakers relates to the relationship between fear and 
anger content in the two sets of communications. While proportions of fear and anger appraisal 
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content varied across Bush’s communications, the two emotions show a more consistent 
relationship in speeches made by Tony Blair. This finding may reflect ‘thematic’ changes 
occurring in Bush’s speeches as compared to more general increases and decreases in overall 
emotional content within Blair’s political speeches. 
Patterns of fear and anger content over time 
For both Bush and Blair, speech content containing fear appraisals elements were 
relatively low throughout 2001 and early 2002. However, on the 10th and 14th of September 
2002, the initial major spikes emerge in both speakers’ first national speeches on the topic of 
Saddam and the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The ensuring pre-Iraq 
war period was then characterised by significantly higher levels of fear content present in on 
average 26% (Bush) and 11% (Blair) of the coded speech material. Anger appraisal was also 
high throughout this period averaging 17% and 20% for the two speakers. The overall presence 
of appraisal content also fluctuates markedly over these months as Bush and Blair make their 
demands of Saddam and these demands are repeatedly ‘defied and mocked’ by ‘the dictator’ 
(Bush, Radio Address, February 8, 2003). The strong presence of fear content at this time is 
especially noteworthy given the almost complete absence of such content in the lead up to the 
War in Afghanistan and throughout both periods of major combat operations.  
The construction of confidence intervals for the proportions of anger and fear content in 
the sampled speeches provides a straightforward way to draw statistical inferences from these 
data. Confidence intervals are informative for proportions close to .5 and with large sample 
sizes (see e.g., Smithson, 2003). Placing 95% confidence intervals around the mean proportion 
of fear appraisals for speeches in the pre-Iraq War period (September 10th, 2001 – March 20th, 
2003) yielded a range of .20 to .31 for Bush and .04 and .17 for Blair. The mean proportions for 
each of the other time periods fall outside the range of plausible values on these measures 
13 
indicating that there were significantly higher levels of fear appraisal in Bush and Blair’s 
speeches in the lead up to the War on Iraq than during any of the other time periods. For anger 
appraisals, a 95% confidence interval for the same time period produced a mean range of .12 to 
.22 for Bush and .16 to .24 for Blair with means for the pre-Afghanistan war period and major 
combat operations in Iraq falling within the range of plausible values. 
Emotional Content and Public Attitudes 
To explore whether variations in content are related to politically relevant measures of 
public opinion, we focused of necessity on the United States and on fear content. Only isolated 
opinion polls on fear of terrorism were conducted in the United Kingdom over the period in 
question and there are no equivalent measures of public anger in either country so these are not 
considered further. However in the United States, a series of CNN/USA Today/Gallup Polls 
monitored public concerns about terrorism by asking subjects: “How worried are you that you 
or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism? Answers were reported on a 5-
point scale with options including: Very worried; somewhat worried, not too worried, not at all 
worried or no opinion. A USA Today/Gallup Poll also provides presidential approval ratings 
over the same dates. Respondents were asked, “do you approve or disapprove of the way 
George W. Bush is handling his job as president.  
The Aftermath of 9/11 
In the weeks and months following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Bush’s 
approval rating leapt from approximately 51% to an unprecedented 88-90% as early as 
September 13th (PollingReport.com, 2004; USA Today/Gallup Poll, 2001). Polling also 
indicated that Americans were indeed frightened at this time. According to the CNN/Opinion 
Research Corporation Poll, 40% of those surveyed believed that further acts of terrorism were a 
very likely possibility in the next few weeks, 45% considered them somewhat likely and only 
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13% thought such attacks were unlikely (CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, October 
2001). Despite these concerns, the vast majority of those surveyed (84%) believed the U.S. 
government was doing a good job reducing the threat of terrorism (Princeton Survey Research 
Associates, 15-21 October 2001), and 92% approved of the way Bush was “handling the U.S. 
campaign against terrorism” (ABC News/Washington Post Poll, October 2001). 
The Lead-up to the ‘War on Terror’ 
A series of public opinion polls from PollingReport.com indicate that Bush’s approval 
ratings remained high throughout late 2001 rarely falling below 85%. However, by mid-March 
2002, support for Bush had declined to less than 80% and this decline continued steadily 
throughout the year. On the 10th of September Bush delivered his first speech on the threats 
posed by Saddam and weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. At the same time, polling data 
indicated that his approval ratings had dropped to approximately 65% (PollingReport.com, 
September, 2002). Bush’s approval rating declined further to 61% by October 2, 2002 and 
remained in the low 60s until early March 2003 (PollingReport.com; Gallup.com). Approval of 
Bush’s “handing of the U.S. campaign against terrorism” also declined from 92% in October 
2001, to 74% by October 2002 (ABC News/Washington Post Poll, October 2002). By February, 
approval of the Bush’s handling of ‘terrorist threats’ had declined further to 67% (Princeton 
Survey Research Associates, February 2003). At this time, only 31% supported immediate 
military involvement – down from approximately 65% two months earlier (CBS News/New 
York Times Poll, 24 January 2003)  
The American public also appeared less fearful of terrorism than they had been 12 
months earlier. Terrorist attacks on American soil were no longer considered an imminent 
threat facing Americans. Now only 12% of those surveyed (in contrast to 40% a year earlier) 
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believed a terrorist attack was a very likely possibility in the next few weeks, 44% thought it 
was somewhat likely and 41% considered it unlikely (Gallop Poll, 13-16 September 2002). 
Combat Operations in Iraq 
On March 22nd 2003 – a mere two days after the invasion – support for US-president 
Bush was up by almost 15 points to 71% (Gallup.com, 22 March 2003) and 75% approval 
(CBS News Poll, March 2003). The high levels of support for Bush only began to decline after 
the declared end in early May (Gallup.com). Approval for U.S. involvement in Iraq also 
reached record highs after the invasion, fluctuating between 68 and 72% throughout this period 
(Gallup.com, March – May, 2003). Although levels of public concern about terrorism remained 
constant throughout this period, American citizens did appear increasingly worried about the 
likelihood of an attack with 21% believing “further acts of terrorism in the United States over 
the next several weeks were very likely”, 52% believing them “somewhat likely” and only 6% 
who considering them “not at all likely” (Gallup Poll, 22-23 March, 2003).  
 
Fear Content and Public Anxiety 
The results from polling data over the period in question suggest that the relationship 
between public fear of terrorism and fear content in political rhetoric is weak at best. This 
finding casts doubt on claims that fear rhetoric has induced sustained fear of terrorism among 
listeners. Interestingly, the major spikes in public concerns about terrorism occur in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the death of a kidnapped US reporter (February, 21, 
2002). These surges in public fear about terrorist may indicate that terror acts have greater 
power than terror rhetoric for inducing public uncertainty and fear. When examining personal 
concerns about terrorism, Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro (2007) observed similar effects with 
public anxiety rising after major terror alerts and events such as the bombings of London’s 
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transit system in 2005. A spike in fear levels also appeared here shortly after the death of three 
U.S. aid workers killed in Yemen (December, 30th, 2002) and coincides with a presentation to 
the U.N by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.  
The close proximity of Powell’s speech to the latter rise in public fear of terrorism 
points to the role that may be played by other political spokespeople in the War on Terrorism. 
Research suggests that some speakers are more important than others when conveying 
messages of threat. Terror warnings from President Bush for example, have been found to have 
greater impact on public threat perception than similar warning from Department of Homeland 
Security officials and other media sources (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon & Shapiro, 2007). However, 
the speeches of other members of the administration such as Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld and Vice President, Dick Cheney may warrant investigation in future research.  
The lack of relationship between fear content and public fear of terrorism also suggests 
that heightened levels of public fear may be somewhat difficult to maintain. Recent research by 
Back, Küfner and Egloff (2010) investigated the emotional content of pager text messages in 
the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. They found that while many 
people experienced heightened anxiety at the time of the attacks, they recovered quickly with 
anxiety returning to baseline level shortly after each event. Anger on the other hand, increased 
steadily after the attacks as information was provided by the news media and other sources. 
Interestingly, the expression of anger peaked immediately after Bush’s public address to the 
nation and again later in the evening with additional media coverage. While polling on levels of 
public anger and outrage is lacking, this recent study indicates that anger appeals in political 
rhetoric may show a somewhat more direct and sustained relationship with public anger in 
response to terrorism.  
Fear Content and Approval Ratings  
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While there appears to be little association between public fear levels and fear content 
in Bush’s rhetoric, fear content was associated with periods of declining support for the 
administration and their counter terrorism policies – most clearly seen in the lead-up to the War 
on Iraq. Similar research examining the quantity and source of statements about terrorist threats 
over the time period in question indicates that despite a general pattern of decline in public 
approval, brief spikes in concerns about terrorism and support for President Bush occur roughly 
in tandem with increased terror warning and news reports citing Bush on the terrorist threat 
(Nacos, Bloch-Elkon & Shapiro, 2007). The authors suggest that official alerts and public 
statements emphasizing the risks of terrorism served to boost public approval of the President’s 
handling of the terrorist threat as well as his overall approval in general. These finding are 
consistent with arguments made by Jackson (2005b) and others (Altheide, 2003; Pyszczynski, 
2004; Robin, 2004; Sunstein, 2004; Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004), that fear appeals in political 
rhetoric are intended to promote support for controversial political policy at times of declining 
support for political leaders and their campaigns. 
Discussion 
The results from the content analysis demonstrate that fear and anger content is indeed 
present in the majority of George Bush and Tony Blair’s sampled speeches. However, the 
amount of this emotional content varies substantially, between speakers and over time. In both 
Bush and Blair’s rhetoric, anger and fear appraisal content is at its highest in the pre-Iraq-war 
period with a near complete absence of fear content before this time. Both periods of major 
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are also characterised by comparatively lower levels 
of anger and fear appraisal content – accounting for less that 10% of coded material. 
Interestingly, these patterns largely replicate the occurrence of fear content identified in the 
rhetoric of former Australian Prime Minister, John Howard (De Castella et al., 2009). In 
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Howard’s speeches the largest spike in fear content was in early February 2003 — Howard’s 
initial statements justifying Australia’s pending involvement in the War on Iraq.  
While these findings suggest a general trend in emotional content throughout the ‘War 
on Terror’, it is important to acknowledge that the content of Bush, Blair and Howard’s 
speeches are not independent of each other. This is in part true because they were talking about 
the same events, but even if different people with different motives were to craft these 
speeches, they remain public communications that are immediately available to other speakers. 
The content and styling of a speech by one leader may thus be echoed in the speech of another. 
Bush, Blair, Howard and their speechwriters undoubtedly possessed varied reasons for 
their choice of rhetoric in framing the War on Terrorism and terrorist threats. Without access to 
internal communications we cannot claim to know the ‘true motives’ guiding these decisions. It 
is dangerous to underplay risks at politically turbulent times and it would have been surprising 
if national leaders had not genuinely experienced and expressed some degree of anger and fear 
in the face of impending war with Iraq. However, one must also assume that political leaders 
are deliberative actors who select their words carefully and strategically in pursuit of a broader 
political agenda. Research based in part on internal memos and other sources indicate in April 
2002, George Bush and Tony Blair had agreed that there needed “to be a political plan in place 
to convince public and world opinion that war was necessary” (Pfiffner, 2007, p. 215). The 
presence then of a correlated pattern of fear content in the rhetoric of all three political leaders 
is consistent with such a plan but is not proof of its existence. 
If, as some critics claim, politicians have been engaged in a campaign of “fear 
mongering” (Altheide, 2003; Jackson, 2005; Lawrence, 2006), the results of the current study 
indicate this campaign has not taken place in a consistent fashion since September 11, 2001. 
Instead it appears that fear content only really began to feature prominently in the ‘War on 
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Terror’ rhetoric prior to the invasion of Iraq. Krebs and Lobasz (2007) explain that in the 
immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 the president’s own rhetoric was ‘notably 
restrained’. Instead these first speeches were typically motivational and patriotic appeals to 
unity and strength: “Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but 
they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent 
the steel of American resolve” (Bush, Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001).  
The fact that explicit fear and anger content emerged later in this rhetoric is noteworthy 
for two main reasons. First, the absence of fear and anger appraisal content at other times 
demonstrates that anger and fear content were not permanent, inevitable aspects of political 
rhetoric — even when discussing the provocative and frightening topic of terrorism. Terrorism 
is an emotive topic that arouses numerous negative connotations particularly in the aftermath of 
September 11. However, it is possible to discuss these issues in a way that seems less likely to 
induce an angry or fearful response from listeners. Secondly, the consistent patterns across 
different speakers also seems to rule out the possibility that emotion inducing content merely 
reflected one leader’s rhetorical style or choice of speechwriter. Instead, fear and anger content 
arose in a correlated fashion between speakers during the lead up to the invasion of Iraq 
suggesting a systematic basis to variations — possibly as a means of generating public support 
for military involvement at times of declining support for government policy (H2).   
An overview of polling trends in the United States throughout this period are consistent 
with claims that emotional appeals are employed with the purpose of promoting support for 
political leaders and their counter-terrorism policies (Flyghed, 2005; Marmor-Lavie & 
Weimann, 2005; Sunstein, 2004). When Bush and Blair’s popularity was high, fear content was 
virtually non-existent in political rhetoric. There was a marked absence of this content despite 
the terrifying nature of events in the aftermath of 9/11 and during periods of major combat 
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operations. Even in speeches advocating anti-terrorism policy (such as prior to the passage of 
the Patriot Act, October 26th 2001), there was very little speech content meeting the criteria for 
fear or anger appraisal when compared to similar speeches at later times. If indeed, fear and 
anger-appeals were being used to generate support for controversial political policy, as claimed 
by Jackson (2005a, b) and others (Altheide, 2003; Furedi, 1997; Pyszczynski, 2004; Robin, 
2004; Sunstein, 2004; Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004), the already high levels of emotional arousal 
and political support may have rendered such appeals unnecessary at this time. Consistent with 
the ‘rally around the flag effect’ (Krebs & Lobasz, 2007), Bush enjoyed a substantial surge in 
public support in the aftermath of 9/11. Personal satisfaction rating and support for the ‘War on 
Terror’ were at record highs and fear of terrorism was already a prominent concern especially 
among American citizens. Meyer (2009) argues that it was with this boost in public support 
following the September 11 attacks, that the Bush administration “seized the moment to press 
its preferred policies globally” (2009, p.20). Even if this is true, it appears that emotional 
content was not yet a predominant feature of Bush public rhetoric. 
While fear content was largely absent in Bush’s early speeches about terrorism, there is 
evidence to suggest that public fear of terrorism may have been playing an important role in 
support for Bush, Blair and the War on Terror. Experimental research by Landau et al. (2004) 
found that when thoughts of vulnerability, death and terrorism were made salient, audiences 
showed increased support for George W. Bush and the administration’s counter-terrorism 
policies. In the aftermath of 9/11, concerns about the threat of terrorism were highest but in the 
ensuing years a relatively high percentage of people continued to be ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ 
worried they and their loved ones would be personally affected by a terrorist attack. An 
analysis of national polling and the administration’s official public statements also reveals that 
the Presidents’ approval ratings did benefit from media coverage of their terror alerts and threat 
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assessments (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon & Shapiro, 2007). These findings may help explain the 
greater support for the War on Terror at times when public fear of terrorism was high.  
Recent research by Huddy, Feldman, Taber & Lahav (2010) indicate that ‘personal’ and 
‘national’ threat perception may also lead to varied responses in citizens. The polling question 
used in the current study – “How worried are you that you or someone in your family will 
become a victim of terrorism?” – represents a measure of perceived personal threat. Using the 
same polling question, Huddy et al. (2010) recently found that concerns of personal threat were 
indeed associated with greater support for George W. Bush as well as his domestic and 
international counter terrorism policies. The same threat perceptions however, did not translate 
into heightened concern about the national economy as seen with measures of ‘national threat’ 
– concerns about the likelihood of future attacks on American soil (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos 
& Provost, 2002). In examining the relationship between fear content and public fear of 
terrorism, the current study has incorporated public polling as a measure of ‘personal threat’. 
‘National threat’ perceptions however and concerns about the broader risks and implications of 
terrorist attacks may show a different pattern of relationship with emotion inducing content in 
political rhetoric. Future research should thus seek to incorporate a wider variety of measures in 
assessing threat perception and emotional responses in listeners.  
While support for Bush and Blair was high in the aftermath of 9/11, it changed 
dramatically in the lead-up to the War on Iraq. Prior to the invasion, a review of polling trends 
indicates that support for George Bush had dropped significantly and the American public were 
decisively less concerned about the risk of terrorism. Our content analysis of speeches at this 
time revealed a significantly greater frequency of fear- and anger-appraisal content particularly 
in speeches justifying military involvement in Iraq. Together, these finding indicate that fear 
content only began to feature prominently in Bush’s rhetoric prior to the invasion of Iraq. This 
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pattern of results is consistent with research by De Castella et al., (2009) and indicates that fear 
and anger content may have been selectively employed to promote public support for military 
engagement at times of heightened political uncertainty, conflict, and declining support for the 
government and its policies. We are at pains to point out however, that the presence of fear or 
anger content in political rhetoric prior to the War on Iraq does not demonstrate that these 
speakers were intending to produce these effects. Our objective has been only to assess the 
plausibility of such claims by evaluating whether these speeches contain content that could 
reasonably be expected to lead to specific emotional reactions in listeners. 
The lack of relationship between emotion inducing content and general fear of terrorism 
was a surprising finding and may indicate that widespread fear of terrorism is somewhat 
difficult to maintain. However, it is important to recognize that fear and anger content in 
political rhetoric may not be aimed solely at eliciting public emotional reactions. Krebs and 
Lobasz (2007) suggest that through a process of ‘rhetorical cohesion’, counter-arguments can 
be framed in ways, which circumscribe political debate and silence political opponents. They 
argue that by establishing the ‘War on Terror’ as the organizing discourse for foreign policy, 
and by framing Saddam Hussein as an evil terrorist threat, the administration undermined 
political opposition. In this way, even if emotionally charged language did not arouse a 
response in listeners it may serve to ‘rhetorically coerce’ opponents, media and other actors 
thus narrowing the space for sustainable political debate.  
Polling trends based on isolated measures of ‘concerns’ about future attacks should also 
be interpreted with caution due to the lack of data over the time period in question. 
Disentangling the antecedents and consequences of personal and national threat, fear and 
anxiety is an important area for future research (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos & Provost, 2002; 
Huddy, Feldman, Taber & Lahav, 2010). The extent to which fear- and anger- content in 
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political rhetoric actually invokes these emotional responses in citizens is also an area ripe for 
investigation. The results of the current study suggest that fear and anger content was 
selectively and variably present in the terrorism-related speeches of two key Western leaders 
and was correlated with changes in public attitudes and political support. The fact that fear and 
anger content is almost absent at some times and pervasively present at others also 
demonstrates that this form communication is neither constant nor inevitable. Alerting the 
public to the threats posed by terrorism may be important for establishing the legitimacy of 
foreign policy decisions however, discussion of these issues is not implicitly tied up with fear 
and anger content. Terrorism is an emotive topic, and responses to it may be massive, vigorous 
and violent, but terror threats can, and were, at times, talked about by these two political leaders 
in ways that seemed less likely to induce angry or fearful reactions from their listeners.  
We do not yet know to what extent other political leaders have used similar forms of 
communication, but the present findings are consistent with recent research in an Australian 
context (De Castella et al., 2009). While further research is clearly needed, appraisal theory-
based content analysis appears to offer a plausible basis for investigating emotional content in 
public communications and may prove a valuable methodology for future inquiry. Further 
research in this area may also benefit from a complementary discourse or textual analysis of 
fear- or anger speech content and a more thorough examination of the political and domestic 
circumstance and media coverage surrounding the delivery of key speeches. A combined 
qualitative analysis would in this way help contextualize coded content and allow for more 
meaningful comparisons between the rhetorical styles of different speakers. An examination of 
later speeches by Bush and Blair (and their successors) would also provide more insight into 
the ways in which their rhetoric may have changed in the ensuing years.  
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Despite growing interest in the field of emotion and political communication (Brader, 
2005, 2006; Huddy et al., 2002, 2010; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lupia & Menning, 2009; 
Marcus & Mackuen, 1993; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse & Stevens, 2005), many questions 
remain unanswered. However, the results of the current study highlight the utility of 
psychological theory and methods for addressing live political issues and informing debates 
that are likely to be intensely partisan. The results provide some support but also some 
refutation of the allegations made by political commentators that the War on Terror has been 
pursued by the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom as a sustained fear 
campaign since 2001. The true picture appears to be that while emotional content is present, the 
frequency and substance of that content has varied substantially over time with fear content 
emerging primarily in speeches at times of declining public support.  
Thus the methods we have presented here help to establish standards for assessing 
rhetoric by political leaders on crucial matters of public policy, but the methods also establish 
standards for assessing the claims of critics of those leaders. In this respect, the suggestion that 
Bush and Blair were engaged in wholesale emotional manipulation in the early stages of the 
war in Afghanistan is not supported by these data. The very same claim is plausible (but not 
proven) for the period leading up to the invasion of Iraq. Importantly, the same methods could 
be deployed prospectively as a resource where similar allegations of emotional manipulation by 
political leader are made about other issues such as border security and crime rates. 
 In conclusion our results begin to shed light on the role of anger and fear content in 
political rhetoric. While it is plausible to claim that the American people became more fearful 
of terrorism following terrorist events (albeit for a short time, Back, Küfner & Egloff, 2010), it 
is difficult to demonstrate that terrorism-related speeches also induced fear. Fear content may 
have helped to legitimise foreign policy positions or narrow avenues for debate about counter 
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terrorism policy. There is, however, little evidence that speeches loaded with fear content 
themselves increased perceptions of personal vulnerability in a widespread or sustained 
fashion. It is even possible that fear rhetoric used by leaders such as President Bush may have 
undermined popular support in the lead up to the War on Iraq – a possibility that merits much 
closer investigation. In any case, it appears efforts by leaders to frighten the people of their own 
nation during a conflict are dubious for ethical, moral and (presumably) military reasons. Our 
research suggests that the putative political dividends of such attempts may also need careful 
assessment. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of Fear and Anger Appraisal Content in Bush and Blair’s Political Speeches about Terrorism. 
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